The paper tackles the issue of checking that all copies of a large data set replicated at several nodes of a network are identical. The fact that the replicas may be located at distant nodes prevents the system from verifying their equality locally, i.e., by having each node consult only nodes in its vicinity. On the other hand, it remains possible to assign certificates to the nodes, so that verifying the consistency of the replicas can be achieved locally. However, we show that, as the data set is large, classical certification mechanisms, including distributed Merlin-Arthur protocols, cannot guarantee good completeness and soundness simultaneously, unless they use very large certificates. The main result of this paper is a distributed quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol enabling the nodes to collectively check the consistency of the replicas, based on small certificates, and in a single round of message exchange between neighbors, with short messages. In particular, the certificate-size is logarithmic in the size of the data set, which gives an exponential advantage over classical certification mechanisms.
Introduction
In the context of distributed systems, the presence of faults potentially corrupting the individual states of the nodes requires to regularly check whether the system is in a global state that is legal with respect to its specification. A basic example is a system storing data, and using replicas in order to support crash failures. In this case, the application managing the data is in charge of regularly checking that the several replicas of the same data, stored at different nodes scattered in the network, are all identical. Another example is an application maintaining a tree spanning the nodes of a network, e.g., for multicast communications. In this case, every node stores a pointer to its parent in the tree, and the application must regularly check that the collection of pointers forms a spanning tree. This paper addresses the issue of checking the correctness of a distributed system configuration at low cost.
Several mechanisms have been designed for certifying the correctness of the global state of a system in a distributed manner. One popular mechanism is called locally checkable proof [20] , an extension of the seminal concept of proof-labeling schemes [31] . In these frameworks, the distributed application does not only construct and/or maintain some distributed data structure (e.g., a spanning tree), but also constructs a distributed proof that the data structure is correct. This proof has the form of a certificate assigned to each node (the certificates assigned to different nodes do not need to be the same). For collectively checking the legality of the current global system state, the nodes exchange their certificates with their neighbors in the network. Then, based on its own individual state, its certificate, and the certificates of its neighbors, every node accepts or rejects, according to the following specification. If the global state is legal, and if the certificates are assigned properly by the application, then all nodes accept. Conversely, if the global state is illegal, then at least one node rejects, no matter which certificates are assigned to the nodes. Such a rejecting node can raise an alarm, or launch a recovery procedure. The main aim of locally checkable proofs is to be compact, that is, to use certificates as small as possible, for two reasons: first, limiting the space complexity at each node, and, second, limiting the message complexity of the verification procedure involving communications between neighbors.
For instance, in the case of a spanning tree, the application does not only construct a spanning tree T of the network, but also a distributed proof that T is indeed a spanning tree, i.e., that the collection T of pointers form a cycle-free connected spanning subgraph. It is known for long [2, 5, 22] that, by assigning to every node a certificate of logarithmic size, the nodes can collectively check whether T is indeed a spanning tree, in a single round of communication between neighboring nodes. The certificate assigned to a node is the identity of the root of the tree, and its distance to this root (both are of logarithmic size as long as the IDs are in a range polynomial in the number of nodes). Every node just checks that it is provided with the same root-ID as all its neighbors in the network, and that the distance given to its parent in its certificate is one less than its own given distance -a node with distance 0 checks that its ID is indeed the root-ID provided in its certificate. Obviously, if the collection T of pointers forms a spanning tree, and if the certificates are assigned properly by the application, then all nodes pass these tests, and accept. On the other hand, it is easy to check that if T is not a spanning tree (it is not connected, or it contains a cycle), then at least one node detects it, no matter which certificates are assigned to the nodes.
Unfortunately, not all boolean predicates on labeled graphs can be distributedly certified using certificates as small as for spanning tree. This is typically the case of the aforementioned scenario of a distributed data storage using replicas, for which one must certify equality. Let us for instance consider the case of two nodes Alice and Bob at the two ex-
Our Results
We carry on the recent trend of research consisting of investigating the power of quantum resources in the context of distributed network computing (cf., e.g., [14, 33, 23, 34, 24, 19] ), by designing a distributed Quantum Merlin-Arthur (dQMA) protocol for distant EQ, using compact certificates and small messages. Specifically, our main result is the following. A collection of n-bit strings x 1 , . . . , x t are stored at t terminal nodes u 1 , . . . , u t in a network G = (V, E), where node u i stores x i . We denote EQ t n the problem of checking the equality x 1 = · · · = x t between the t strings. Let us define the radius of a given instance of EQ t n as r = min i max j dist G (u i , u j ), where dist G denotes the distance in the (unweighted) graph G. Our main result is the design of a dQMA protocol for EQ t n , using small certificate. This can be summarized by the following informal statement (the formal statement is in Section 5):
◮ Main Result. There is a distributed Quantum Merlin-Arthur (dQMA) protocol for certifying equality between t binary strings (EQ t n ) of length n, and located at a radius-r set of t terminals, using certificates of size O(tr 2 log n) qubits, and messages of size O(tr 2 log(n+r)) qubits.
It is worth mentioning that, although the dependence in r and t is polynomial, the dependence in the actual size n of the instance remains logarithmic, which is our main concern. Indeed, for applications such as the aforementioned distributed data storage motivating the distant EQ t n problem, it is expected that both the number t of replicas, and the maximum distance between the nodes storing these replicas to be of several orders of magnitude smaller than the size n of the stored replicated data.
It is also important to note that our protocol satisfies the basic requirement of reusability, as one aims for protocols enabling regular and frequent verifications that the data are not corrupted. Specifically, the quantum operations performed on the certificates during the local verification phase operated between neighboring nodes preserve the quantum nature of these certificates. That is, if EQ t n is satisfied, i.e., if all the replicas x i 's are equal, then, up to an elementary local relocation of the quantum certificates, these certificates are available for a next test. If EQ t n is not satisfied, i.e., if there exists a pair of replicas x i = x j , then the certificates do not need to be preserved as this scenario corresponds to the case where the correctness of the data structure is violated, requiring the activation of recovery procedures for fixing the bug, and reassigning certificates to the nodes.
Finally, observe that our logarithmic upper bound for dQMA protocols is in contrast to the linear lower bound that can be shown for classical dMA protocols even for t = 2 on a path of 4 nodes (see precise statement and proof in Appendix A). Our results thus show that quantum certification mechanism can provide an exponential advantages over classical certification mechanisms.
Related Work
The concept of distributed proof is present in the framework of distributed network computing since the early work on fault-tolerance (see, e.g., [2, 5, 22] )). Proof-labeling schemes have been introduced in [31] , and variants have been studied in [20, 16] . Randomized prooflabeling schemes have been studied in [18] . Extensions of distributed proofs to a hierarchy of decision mechanisms have studied in [15] and [6] . Frameworks like Cloud computing recently enabled envisioning systems in which the nodes of the network could interact with a third party. This led to the concept of distributed interactive proofs [30] . In this context, each node can interact with an oracle who has a complete view of the system, is computationally unbounded, but is not trustable. For instance, in Arthur-Merlin (dAM) protocols, the nodes start by querying the oracle Merlin, which provides them with answers in their certificates. There is a simple classical compact dAM protocol for distant EQ, where the two players stand at the extremities of a path (see Section 3). Nevertheless, although distributed Arthur-Merlin protocols provide an appealing framework for studying the power of interactive proofs in the distributed setting, the practical implementation of such protocols remain questionable, as whether or not an entity such as the Cloud could play the role of the oracle Merlin is debatable. Instead, dMA as well as dQMA protocols do not necessarily require the interaction with an external party, as the certificates can be forged by the nodes themselves during a pre-processing phase. Yet, we refer to [12, 17, 35] for recent developments in the framework of distributed interactive proofs.
After a few early works [7, 14, 19, 39] that shed light on the potential and limitations of quantum distributed computing (see also [4, 10, 13] for general discussions), evidences of the advantage of quantum distributed computing over classical distributed computing have been obtained recently for three fundamental models of (synchronous fault-free) distributed network computing: the CONGEST model [24, 33] , the CONGEST-CLIQUE model [23] and the LOCAL model [34] . The present paper adds to this list another important task for which quantum distributed computing significantly outperforms classical distributed computing, namely, distributed certification.
Note that while this paper is the first to study quantum Merlin-Arthur protocols in a distributed computing framework, there are a number of prior works studying them in communication complexity [38, 26, 27, 9] . In particular, quantum Merlin-Arthur protocols are shown to improve some computational measure (say, the total length of the messages from the prover to Alice, and of the messages between Alice and Bob) exponentially compared to Merlin-Arthur protocols where the messages from the prover are classical [38, 27] .
Our quantum protocol is based on the SWAP test [11] , which is a basic tool in the theory of quantum computation and quantum information. This test allows to check if a quantum state is symmetric, and has several applications, such as estimating the inner product of two states (e.g., [11, 8, 42] ), checking whether a given state (or a reduced state of it) is pure or entangled with the environment system (e.g., [1, 29, 21, 28] ), and more. In this paper, we use the SWAP test in yet another way: for checking if two of the reduced states of a given state are close.
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Model and Definitions
Distributed verification on graphs. Let t ≥ 2, and let f : ({0, 1} n ) t → {0, 1} be a function. The aim of the nodes is to collectively decide whether f (x 1 , . . . , x t ) = 1 or not, where x 1 , . . . , x t are assigned to t nodes of a graph. Specifically, an instance of the problem f is a t-tuple (x 1 , . . . , x t ) ∈ {0, 1} n × · · · × {0, 1} n , a connected graph G = (V, E), and an ordered sequence v 1 , . . . , v t of distinct nodes of G. The node v i is given x i as input, for i = 1, . . . , t. All the other nodes receive no inputs. We consider distributed Merlin-Arthur (dMA) protocols for deciding whether f (x 1 , . . . , x t ) = 1. That is, the non-trustable prover assigns (or "sends") certificates to the nodes, and then the nodes perform a 1-round randomized verification algorithm, i.e., an algorithm consisting of exchanging (in a synchronous way) information only between neighbors and performing individual computations at each node. We say that a dMA protocol has completeness a and soundness b for a function f if the following holds for every (x 1 , . . . , x t ) ∈ {0, 1} n × · · · × {0, 1} n , every connected graph G, and every ordered sequence v 1 , . . . , v t of distinct nodes in G:
(completeness) if f (x 1 , . . . , x t ) = 1, then the prover can assign certificates to the nodes such that Pr[all nodes accept] ≥ a; (soundness) if f (x 1 , . . . , x t ) = 0, then, for every certificate assignment by the prover, Pr[all nodes accept] ≤ b.
The completeness condition guarantees that, with probability at least a, all nodes are agreeing that the system is in a "legal" state (specified by f (x 1 , . . . , x t ) = 1). The soundness condition guarantees that, with probability at least 1−b, at least one node will detect that the system is in an "illegal" state (specified by f (x 1 , . . . , x t ) = 0). A node detecting illegality of the state can raise an alarm, or launch a recovery procedure. Protocols with completeness 1 are called 1-sided protocols, or protocols with perfect completeness. Similarly to prior works on distributed verification, the certificate size of the protocol is measured as the maximum size (over all the nodes of the network) of the certificate sent by the prover to one of the nodes, and the message size of the protocol is measured as the maximum size (over all pairs of adjacent nodes) of the message exchanged between two adjacent nodes. Specifically, we will consider the multi-party version of the equality function, EQ t n , which is the boolean-valued function from ({0, 1} n ) t such that EQ t n (x 1 , . . . , x t ) = 1 ⇐⇒ x 1 = · · · = x t . In this work, we extend the framework of dMA protocols, to consider also cases where the certificates given to the nodes can contain qubits (although they may also contain classical bits) and the nodes can exchange messages consisting of qubits. These will be called distributed Quantum Merlin-Arthur (dQMA) protocols. All our quantum protocols do not require any prior entanglement (or any shared randomized) between the nodes. the value f (x, y) for some known Boolean function f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1}. Only Alice can send a message to Bob. The one-way two-sided-error communication complexity of f is the minimum number of bits that have to be sent on the worst input in a protocol that outputs the correct answer with probability at least 2/3. The one-way one-sided-error communication complexity of f is the minimum number of bits that have to be sent on the worst input in a protocol that outputs the correct answer with probability 1 on any 1-input, and outputs the correct answer with probability at least 2/3 on any 0-input.
We shall especially consider the following two functions. The equality function EQ n is defined as EQ n (x, y) = 1 when x = y and EQ n (x, y) = 0 otherwise, for any x, y ∈ {0, 1} n . Its one-way one-sided-error communication complexity is O(log n) -see, e.g., [32] . For any integer d ≥ 0, the Hamming distance function HAM d n is defined as follows: for any x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , HAM d n (x, y) = 1 if the Hamming distance between x and y is at most d, and HAM d n (x, y) = 0 otherwise. It is known [42] that, for d constant, the one-way two-sided-error communication complexity of HAM d n is O(log n).
fooling set for f if, on the one hand, for every (x, y) ∈ S, f (x, y) = 1, and, on the other hand, for every two pairs (
Quantum two-party communication complexity. We assume the reader is familiar with the basics of quantum computation, in particular the notion of qubits, Dirac notation such as |ψ and ψ| := (|ψ ) † , and the quantum circuit model (see Sections 2 and 4 in Ref. [36] , for instance). In Appendix B we present more advanced concepts such as mixed states that will be used in some of our proofs.
Quantum two-party communication complexity, first introduced by Yao [41] , is defined similarly to the classical version. The only difference is that the players are allowed to exchange qubits instead of bits (the cost of a quantum protocol is the number of qubits sent by the protocol). Note that since quantum protocols can trivially simulate classical protocols, the quantum communication complexity of a function is never larger than its classical communication complexity. More precisely, an m-qubit one-way quantum protocol π for the function f can be described in its most general form as follows. Alice prepares an m-qubit (pure) quantum state |h x and sends it to Bob. 4 Bob then makes a measurement on the state |h x , which gives an outcome b ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, Bob outputs b. Since Bob's measurement in the above description depends only on his input y, it can be mathematically described, for each y ∈ {0, 1} n , by two positive semi-definite matrices M y,0 and M y,1 such that M y,0 + M y,1 = I. This pair {M y,0 , M y,1 } is called a POVM measurement (POVM measurements are the most general form of measurements allowed by quantum mechanics). If |h x is measured by the POVM {M y,0 , M y,1 }, the probability that b = 0 is tr(M y,0 (|h x h x |)), while the probability that b = 1 is tr(M y,1 (|h x h x |)).
General Overview of our Techniques
Let us provide an intuition of our protocol in the case of EQ 2 n over a path v 0 , . . . , v r of length r ≥ 1 in which the terminals are the two nodes v 0 and v r (that we rename Alice and Bob, for convenience). Let us call x and y the n-bit strings owned by Alice and Bob, respectively.
There is a simple classical dAM protocol for distant equality. In this protocol, Alice picks a hash function h at random in an appropriate family of hash functions (i.e., a family such that both h and h(x) can be encoded using O(log n) bits and such that the probability that h(x) = h(y) is high when x = y). Merlin provides every node with (h, h(x)), and Bob checks whether h(x) = h(y). Obviously, one cannot switch the order of Arthur and Merlin, as letting Merlin choose the hash function would enable him to fool Arthur on illegal instances by picking h that hashes identically the distinct input strings x and y. The main idea of our dQMA protocol is to ask Merlin to provide the nodes with a quantum certificate consisting of the quantum superposition of all the possible hashes.
Entering slightly more into the details, for any x ∈ {0, 1} n we consider the quantum
, where the sum is over all the hash functions, and 1 √ K is the normalization factor of the quantum state. By using the same family of hash functions as in the aforementioned dAM protocol, these fingerprints can be constructed in such a way that their length is O(log n) qubits, and |h x and |h y are very far (more precisely, almost orthogonal) when x = y. Checking whether the two quantum fingerprints |h x and |h y are either equal or far apart can be achieved by a quantum test called the SWAP test [11] . Formally, the probability that the SWAP test accepts is 1/2 + | h x |h y | 2 /2, where h x |h y denotes the inner product between the two quantum states |h x and |h y .
Let us now describe the outline of our dQMA protocol. In the protocol each intermediate node v 1 , . . . , v r−1 expects to receive the quantum fingerprint |h x . Alice, who does not receive any certificate, creates by herself the fingerprint |h x , which depends only on x. Similarly, Bob creates by himself the fingerprint |h y . The checking procedure simply checks whether all these (r + 1) fingerprints are equal. This is done by applying the SWAP test to check whether the fingerprints owned by adjacent nodes are equal or not. There are however a few subtleties. In particular, since our analysis crucially requires that the SWAP tests do not overlap, for each node we need to decide whether it will perform the SWAP test with its right neighbor or its left neighbor. We do it in a randomized way and deal carefully with the conflicting choices that appear. For the case x = y all the SWAP tests then succeed with probability 1 and thus all the nodes accept.
For the case x = y, let us provide some intuition about why a prover cannot fool the nodes for convincing them to all accept. To simplify the description we assume below that |h x and |h y are orthogonal (instead of only almost orthogonal). If the prover was forced to send certificates restricted to product states of the form |g 1 ⊗ |g 2 ⊗ · · · |g r−1 where |g j is the state to the jth node, then a fairly straightforward argument would guarantee that, with large probability, at least one node rejects. Indeed, under the product states restriction, intuitively the best strategy for the prover to cheat is to send states "intermediate" between |h x and |h y , namely, to send the state |g j = cos(πj/2r)|h x + sin(πj/2r)|h y to node v j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}. Then, the probability that all nodes accept when performing the SWAP tests would be roughly
The cheating prover could then be caught with probability Ω(1/r), and this probability can be amplified to Ω(1) by asking the prover to send several copies of the certificates (amplification is possible since our protocol has perfect completeness).
The formal analysis of the protocol however faces several difficulties, which are mostly due to the nature of quantum computation, and are especially challenging to handle in the framework of distributed computation. For instance, quantum states cannot be duplicated (the "no-cloning Theorem"), which implies that a same quantum state cannot be used for parallel tests. Additionally, even sequential tests face the difficulty that the first test may collapse the quantum state, making the second test impossible to perform (or at least significantly complicating the analysis of the second test). Thus node v i cannot perform the SWAP test with its two neighbors v i−1 and v i+1 simultaneously and (as already mentioned) we have to design carefully the protocol so that the SWAP test do not overlap. A second, and much more problematic issue is that the non-trustable Merlin can send arbitrary certificates to the nodes for fooling them. In particular it is not bounded to send certificates that are product states. A priori, it may seem that the SWAP test is not strong enough to handle fooling strategies beyond product states. In this work we show that the SWAP can actually detect such fooling strategies.
Specifically, our approach consists in considering the so-called reduced states, and to establish the following property of the SWAP test (cf. Lemma 5 in Section 4). If the SWAP test accepts with high probability when applied on the part of any two adjacent nodes in a (possibly non-product) global quantum state resulting from the certificates, then the two reduced states of that part (which is a bipartite state) must be close. As the two states |h x and |h y are very far apart when x = y, we can thus use this result to show that there is a good probability that the SWAP test rejects at some node. Moreover, using reduced states allows us to overcome other technical difficulties in the analysis of the (non-overlapping) SWAP tests we consider. Indeed, some form of average-case success probability of all the SWAP tests can be considered, instead of having to argue about the probability that all the SWAP tests individually accept.
Quantum Distributed Proofs on Paths
In this section we restrict ourselves to the case of a path v 0 , . . . , v r of length r ≥ 1, in which only the two extremities v 0 and v r are given inputs. This framework allows us to elaborate our main technique, that will be extended to arbitrary graphs in Section 5. Let x ∈ {0, 1} n be the input to v 0 , and y ∈ {0, 1} n be the input to v r . Our goal is to design a dQMA protocol to decide whether f (x, y) = 1 or not, for some given Boolean function on {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n . We show the following general theorem that converts a one-way quantum communication complexity protocol into a quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol for the corresponding longdistance problem on the path. This theorem applies not only to one-sided-error protocols, but also to the two-sided-error case (with a logarithmic additional factor in the complexity). If f has a quantum one-way one-sided-error communication protocol transmitting at mostubits, then there exists a 1-sided quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol for f on the path of length r, with soundness 1/3, using certificates of size O(r 2 q) qubits, and exchanging messages of length O(r 2 (q + log r)) qubits. If f has a quantum one-way two-sided-error communication protocol transmitting at mostubits, then, for any constant c, there exists a quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol for f on the path of length r with completeness 1 − 1/n c , soundness 1/3, using certificates of size O(r 2 q log(n + r)) qubits, and exchanging messages of length O(r 2 q log(n + r)) qubits.
Using known results (cf. Section 2) about one-way communication complexities of EQ n and HAM d n , the following two results are direct applications of Theorem 1.
◮ Corollary 2. There exists a 1-sided quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol for EQ n in the path of length r with soundness 1/3, using certificates of size O(r 2 log n) qubits, and exchanging messages of length O(r 2 log(n + r)) qubits.
◮ Corollary 3. For any c > 0 and d > 0, there exists a quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol for HAM d n in the path of length r with completeness 1−1/n c , soundness 1/3, using certificates of length O(r 2 (log n) log(n + r)) qubits, and exchanging messages of length O(r 2 (log n) log(n + r)) qubits.
The goal of the remaining of this section is to prove Theorem 1. Let us first give an overview of the proof. In our dQMA protocol in the path, the verification algorithm performed by the nodes on the line is merely a simulation of a two-party one-way quantum communication complexity protocol π between Alice and Bob for the function f (x, y) , with the help of certificates provided by the prover. Specifically, every intermediate node v 1 , . . . , v r−1 expects to receive the quantum state sent by Alice to Bob in π, as certificate. Let us denote by |h x this state, which depends on x. The right-end node v r simulates the two-party protocol π using |h x received from the left neighbor v r−1 , and applying Bob's measurement (i.e., the POVM measurement). If f (x, y) = 1, the prover honestly sends the desired state, and v r accepts as it does receive |h x . However, if f (x, y) = 0, then the malicious prover does not necessarily send a desired state. To catch the potentially malicious behavior of the prover on "illegal" instances (i.e., those for which f (x, y) = 0), each intermediate node checks whether its local proof is "close to" the one of its right neighbor. This is performed by an application of the SWAP test. Section 4.1 below describes in more detail how to construct the distributed quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol, denoted P π , from an arbitrary one-way quantum communication protocol π for the function f . Section 4.2 analyzes the completeness and the soundness of the protocol P π . Finally, Section 4.3 shows how to improve the soundness using "parallel repetitions" and how to apply this analysis to prove Theorem 1.
A dQMA Protocol for the Path
Let ε ≥ 0 be a constant, which will be fixed small enough later in the proof. Let π be a quantum one-way communication protocol for f transmitting at mostubits, such that, for every input pair (x, y), if f (x, y) = 1 then π outputs 1 with probability at least 1 − ε, and if f (x, y) = 0 then π outputs 0 with probability at least 2/3. Let |h x be the q-qubit (pure) state sent from Alice to Bob, and let {M y,1 , M y,0 } be the POVM measurement performed by Bob on |h x , where M y,1 corresponds to the measurement result 1 (accept) and M y,0 to the measurement result 0 (reject). Our quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol P π is as follows.
Protocol P π for function f on input pair (x, y) in path v 0 , . . . , v r : 1. If f (x, y) = 1 then the prover sends the quantum register R j that has a state |h x (or |h x h x | as the mixed state representation) as certificate to each of the intermediate nodes v j , j ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}. 2. The left-end node v 0 prepares the state ρ 0 = |h x h x | in quantum register R 0 . 3. For every j = 0, . . . , r − 1, the node v j chooses a bit b j uniformly at random, and sends its quantum register R j to the right neighbor v j+1 whenever b j = 0. 4. For every j = 1, . . . , r − 1, if v j receives a quantum register from its left neighbor v j−1 , and if b j = 1, then v j performs the SWAP test on the registers (R j−1 , R j ), and accepts or rejects accordingly; Otherwise, v j accepts. 5. If the right-end node v r receives a quantum register R r−1 from its left neighbor, then v r performs the POVM measurement {M y,1 , M y,0 } corresponding to π applied to the state in R r−1 , and accepts or rejects accordingly; Otherwise, v r accepts.
In the above protocol P π , the size of the quantum certificate that each node receives from the prover is at most q, and the length of the quantum message that each node sends to the neighbor is also at most q. In the next subsection, we prove that the above protocol has completeness 1 − ε/2 and soundness 1 − 1/42r 2 .
Analysis of Protocol P π
For the analysis, we recall the SWAP test. The test is a protocol with a given input state on 1 −1 on the state in register R 0 , and measure the content in the standard basis. Accept if the content is 0, and reject otherwise.
Completeness.
The following lemma is a direct consequence of the definition of the SWAP test (see the proof in Appendix C). Here, H S is the symmetric subspace in H (namely, the subspace spanned by the states invariant by the swap operator S, or equivalently, the eigenstates of S with eigenvalue 1), and H A is the anti-symmetric subspace in H (namely, the subspace spanned by the eigenstates of S with eigenvalue −1). Note that any state in H is represented as the superposition of a state in H S (symmetric state) and a state in H A (anti-symmetric state). For completeness, assume f (x, y) = 1. The prover then sends |h x to all the intermediate nodes. Then, all the nodes except the right-end node have |h x . By Lemma 4, all the SWAP tests done in Step 4 are accepted with probability 1 (note that |h x ⊗ |h x is a symmetric state). Furthermore, the right-end node accepts with probability at least 1/2 + (1 − ε)/2 = 1 − ε/2.
Soundness.
The following lemma is our crucial property of the SWAP test, for checking whether the two reduced states are close. Here, a reduced state intuitively represents the local information on its own quantum system, by disregarding the outside systems. Note that the trace distance between two quantum states ρ and σ is characterized as dist(ρ, σ) = max M tr (M (ρ − σ) ), where the maximization is taken over all positive semi-definite matrices M such that M ≤ I. ◮ Lemma 5. Let z ≥ 1, and assume that the SWAP test on input ρ in the input register (R 1 , R 2 ) accepts with probability 1 − 1/z. Then, dist(ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) ≤ 2/ √ z + 1/z, where ρ j is the reduced state on R j of ρ. Moreover, if the SWAP test on input ρ accepts with probability 1, then ρ 1 = ρ 2 (and hence dist(ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) = 0).
The proof can be found in Appendix D. For soundness, let (x, y) such that any pair such that f (x, y) = 0. The proof of the following simple lemma, which crucially uses Lemma 5, can be found in Appendix E. ◮ Lemma 6. For every j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, let F j be the event that v j performs the local test (SWAP or POVM) in Protocol P π , and let E j be the event that this local test rejects. Then we have
In Steps 4 and 5, node v j , 1 ≤ j ≤ r, performs the local test (SWAP or POVM) with probability at least 1/4 (more precisely, v j , 1 ≤ j ≤ r − 1, performs the SWAP test with probability 1/4 and v r performs the POVM with probability 1/2). It follows that, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, the event F j occurs in at least (1/4) × 2 r outcomes of all the 2 r possible outcomes b 0 · · · b r−1 that can be obtained in Step 3. Here, we consider any fixed outcomes b 0 · · · b r−1 that induce k events F j1 , F j2 , . . . , F j k with k = 0 where we note that 0 ≤ k ≤ ⌊r/2⌋ in general. The probability that some node rejects in Steps 4 or 5 under this outcome is
where the inequality comes from Lemma 13 in Appendix F, and the equality comes from the fact that each of F ji and E ji is independent from all the other event F j i ′ with i ′ = i (in particular, F j−1 and F j never occur at the same time). As each outcome occurs with probability 1/2 r , the probability that some node rejects in Steps 4 or 5 is at least
where the second last inequality comes from Lemma 6.
Proof of Theorem 1
So far, we have shown that the protocol P π has a completeness parameter very close to 1, but poor soundness. To establish Theorem 1, we need to improve soundness without degrading the completeness too much. This is achieved via a form of parallel repetition of P π , by taking the logical conjunction of the outputs obtained by repetitions. The protocol resulting from k repetitions of P π is denoted by P π [k]. Its formal presentation can be found in Appendix G.
Protocol P π [k] has completeness (1 − ε/2) k , that is, the completeness has not reduced much whenever ε is small. By a similar analysis of standard amplification for quantum Merlin-Arthur games as the analysis in [3, 25] , one can show that P π [k] has soundness (1−1/42r 2 ) k . By choosing k = 84r 2 , the resulting protocol P π [k] has completeness 1−42r 2 ε and soundness (1/e) 2 < 1/3, while the size of the certificates is O(r 2 q) qubits, and the length of the message exchanged between neighbors is O(r 2 (q + log r)) (where the additional term log r comes from the index to the right neighbor in Step 3 of P π [k]).
Theorem 1 can now be easily derived from the above analysis. For the first part of the theorem, where f is having a one-sided-error one-way protocol π, simply use the protocol P π from Section 4.1 with ε = 0. The result then follows from the analysis of Section 4.2 and from the above discussion about soundness reduction.
For the case of second part of the theorem, where f is having a two-sided-error one-way protocol, we repeat the protocol π for O(log(n + r)) times and using majority voting to get a protocol that correctly computes the value of the function with probability at least 1 − 1/42n c r 2 . The protocol π of Section 4.1 can thus be chosen with ε = 1/42n c r 2 , with message size O(q log(n + r)). The result then follows similarly. ◭
Certifying Equality in Trees
Based on Lemmas 7 and 8, we can restrict our attention to the case in which the t terminals u 1 , . . . , u t , who hold the n-bit strings x 1 , . . . , x t , belong to a tree T rooted at u 1 , of depth equal to r+1, where r is the radius of the terminals, with maximum degree t, and with leaves u 2 , . . . , u t . Moreover, the root u 1 itself is of degree 1. We present a distributed quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol for the equality function EQ t n in this setting, and hence prove our main result. ◮ Theorem 9. There is a one-round distributed quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol on T for EQ t n between t terminals of radius r, with perfect completeness, soundness 1/3, certificate size O(t r 2 log n) qubits, and message length O(t r 2 log(n + r)) qubits.
Proof. Let π be a one-way communication protocol for EQ n transmitting m = O(log n) qubits such that, for every input pair (x, y), if x = y then π outputs 1 with probability 1 and if x = y then π outputs 0 with probability at least 2/3 (such a protocol exists, as mentioned in Section 2). For input (x, y), let |h x be the quantum message from Alice to Bob in π, and let {M y,1 , M y,0 } be the POVM measurement done by Bob on |h x in π, where M y,1 corresponds to the measurement result 1 (accept), and M y,0 corresponds to the measurement result 0 (reject), respectively. Our quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol is as follows.
Protocol P(EQ t n ) for equality in trees 1. If EQ t n (x 1 , . . . , x t ) = 1 then the prover sends an m-qubit state equal to |h x1 to each of the nodes v that have no input. then v performs the SWAP test on the 2m-qubit state that consists of the m-qubit state received from the prover and an m-qubit state received from the children, which is chosen uniformly at random if he/she receives multiple m-qubit states from the children, and accepts or rejects accordingly. Otherwise, v accepts. 5. If the root node u 1 receives a state from its children, then u 1 performs the POVM measurement {M x1,1 , M x1,0 } on an m-qubit state received from the children, which is chosen uniformly at random if he/she receives multiple m-qubit states from the children, and accepts or rejects accordingly. Otherwise, u 1 accepts.
The perfect completeness trivially holds since every local test yields acceptance with certainty. For soundness, if EQ t n (x 1 , . . . , x t ) = 0 then there is a leaf u i , i > 1, holding x i = x 1 . Then, we can perform almost the same analysis as in Section 4, but for the path connecting u 1 and u i in T . The only difference is the probability that each local test occurs; it is at least 1/4 in the analysis of P π done in Section 4, while it is at least (1/4) × (1/t) in the protocol P(EQ t n ) we are now considering, as every non-terminal node v j or u 1 on the path chooses the m-qubit state from the child on the path uniformly at random from the multiple m-qubit states (possibly) sent from all the children. It follows that P(EQ t n ) has soundness 1 − O(1/tr 2 ). The proof is completed by performing O(tr 2 ) parallel repetitions of P(EQ t n ) for error reduction, in the same way one performed O(r 2 ) parallel repetitions of P π in Section 4. ◭ Remark. Using Lemma 8, we get that, up to adding O(log |V |) classical bits in the certificates of the nodes, Theorem 9 can be extended to the case where the terminals are in a connected graph G = (V, E).
Conclusion
In this paper, we extended the notion of randomized proof-labeling scheme to the quantum setting. We showed the efficiency of distributed quantum certification mechanisms by designing a distributed quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol for EQ t n between t parties spread out in a graph, using certificates and messages whose size depend logarithmically on n, the size of the data. This is in contrast to classic distributed Merlin-Arthur protocols, which require certificates of size linear in n, independently from the message length. Our result has been obtained by revisiting the SWAP test, and demonstrating that this test can be applied for checking proximity properties between reduced states.
Which other Boolean predicates on labeled graphs, beyond equality, could take benefit from quantum resources for the design of compact distributed certification schemes is an intriguing question. Theorem 1 gives a partial answer on the path. A complete answer to this question would significantly help improving our comprehension of the power of quantum computing in the distributed setting.
A P P E N D I X

A Classical Lower Bounds
In this section, we show that classical distributed Merlin-Arthur (dMA) protocols for distant EQ require certificates of linear size. In fact, we establish a more general lower bound which applies to all function f with large fooling set, even using shared randomness. For the lower bound, it is sufficient to consider the path v 0 , . . . , v r in which v 0 and v r are provided with inputs x and y, respectively. Proof. For every i = 0, 1, . . . , r, let w i (x, y) be the certificate provided to the ith node v i of the path by the prover for inputs (x, y). Since f has large 1-fooling set, but small certificates, for any index j ∈ {1, . . . , r − 2} there exist two distinct pairs of inputs (x 1 , y 1 ) and (x 2 , y 2 ) with f (x 1 , y 1 ) = f (x 2 , y 2 ) = 1, and (w.l.o.g.) f (x 1 , y 2 ) = 0 such that w j (x 1 , y 1 ) = w j (x 2 , y 2 ) and w j+1 (x 1 , y 1 ) = w j+1 (x 2 , y 2 ).
(1)
The output out i of every node v i is a function of its own certificate, the certificates of its one or two neighbors, its identifier, and the public random string s. In addition, the outputs of v 0 and v 1 (resp., v r and v r−1 ) may also depend on the input x to v 0 (resp., the input y to v r ). We interpret the outputs as Booleans, where accept = true = 1, and reject = false = 0. Let
Since P has completeness 1 − p, the following inequality holds for every a ∈ {1, 2},
This implies that
By the union bound,
Noting Eqs. (1) , this latter inequality means that there exist some certificates that the prover can assign to the nodes for convincing them to all accept, with probability at least 1 − 2p, on a pair (x 1 , y 2 ) of inputs such that f (x 1 , y 2 ) = 0. ◭ Since EQ n has a 1-fooling set of size 2 n , the corollary below follows directly from Theorem 10.
◮ Corollary 11. For every r ≥ 4, every distributed (classical) Merlin-Arthur protocol for EQ 2 n in the path of length r with certificates of size at most ⌊(n − 1)/2⌋ bits, and completeness 1 − p has soundness at least 1 − 2p.
The requirements for a good protocol is to have a high completeness (i.e., small value for p, ideally p = 0) and a reasonably small soundness. Corollary 11 precisely shows that for the equality function such protocols cannot exist in the classical setting unless the certificate size is linear in n.
Remark. The completeness-soundness gap of Theorem 10 is optimal in general, in the sense that it cannot be improved for EQ 2 1 , i.e., distant equality between two input bits. Consider the following protocol P for EQ 2 1 , on input (x, y) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}. It uses a shared random variable X ∈ {−1, 0, 1} with Pr[X = 0] = Pr[X = 1] = p, and Pr[X = −1] = 1 − 2p. In the case X = −1, all the nodes accept. In the case X ∈ {0, 1}, v 0 accepts whenever X = x, v r accepts whenever X = y, and all the other nodes accept. If x = y, the probability that all the nodes accept is 1 − 2p + (1/2) · (2p) = 1 − p. If x = y, then either v 0 or v r systematically rejects for X = −1, and thus the probability that all the nodes accept is 1 − 2p.
B Quantum Fundamentals
Here we summarize some notation and properties that are used in this paper. As a terminology, we sometime identify physical concepts (such as pure states) and their mathematical representations (such as vectors).
A mixed state on a complex Euclidian space H is considered as a representation of a probability distribution of pure quantum states (represented like |ψ as vectors on H). If the quantum state in H is a pure state |ψ j with probability p j , its mixed state is represented as the positive semi-definite matrix σ = j p j |ψ j ψ j | (the symbol ρ or σ is often used for representing a mixed state). In particular, a (pure) quantum state |ψ is written as the projector |ψ ψ| of rank 1. If this state evolves by a unitary operation U , the state changes into U σU † = j U |ψ j ψ j |U † . We call a mixed state simply a (quantum) state (as far as we do not care about the difference between pure and mixed states).
For A POVM (positive operator valued measure) on a complex Euclidian space H represents a general measurement on a quantum state on H. In particular, a binary-valued POVM (which we use in this paper) on H is a set {M 0 , M 1 } that consists of two positive semidefinite matrices M 0 and M 1 on H such that M 0 + M 1 = I. If a mixed state ρ is measured by {M 0 , M 1 }, the probability that the outcome with M j (j = 0, 1) is obtained is tr(M j ρ).
For any matrix M on complex Euclidian space H, the trace norm of M is defined as
For any two mixed states ρ and σ in H, the trace distance between ρ and σ is defined as
which satisfies that 0 ≤ dist(ρ, σ) ≤ 1 (as dist(ρ, σ) becomes close to 0, ρ and σ become close). In particular, for any pure states |ψ , |φ , it holds that
An important characterization of the trace distance is
where the maximization is taken over all positive semi-definite matrices M such that M ≤ I. This characterization means that dist(ρ, σ) is equal to the difference between the probability that the "best" POVM measurement {M, I − M }, for distinguishing ρ and σ, on the state ρ gives the outcome with the POVM element M , tr(M ρ), and the probability that the same POVM measurement on σ gives the outcome with M , tr(M σ). For any two mixed states ρ and σ in H, the fidelity between ρ and σ, denoted as F (ρ, σ), is another measure of their closeness, and it holds that 0 ≤ F (ρ, σ) ≤ 1 (as F (ρ, σ) becomes close to 1, ρ and σ become close). For this measure, we need only the following equality, which is found in Ref. [40] for instance.
◮ Lemma 12 (Corollary 3.23 in Ref. [40] [40] , for instance, for more information on (bipartite as well as multipartite) symmetric states and anti-symmetric states.
C Proof of Lemma 4
Noting that S|ψ S = |ψ S and S|ψ A = −|ψ A , the state after Step 2 is
The final state obtained in Step 3 is
Thus, the probability that 0 is measured on R 0 (and thus is accepted) is |α| 2 .
D Proof of Lemma 5
First, we observe the second statement. By Lemma 4, if ρ includes some asymmetric state, the SWAP test rejects with a non-zero probability. Hence, ρ must consist of only symmetric states, which means that the two reduced states of ρ coincides.
In the remaining part, we prove the first statement. The mixed state ρ can be represented as ρ = j p j |ψ j ψ j | (which means that the state is in a (pure) state |ψ j with probability p j ). Moreover, each |ψ j can be represented as a superposition of a symmetric state and an antisymetric state, namely, |ψ j = α j |ψ S j + β j |ψ A j with some symmetric state |ψ S j and some antisymmetric state |ψ A j , where |α j | 2 + |β j | 2 = 1. Then, by Lemma 4 and the assumption, j p j |α j | 2 ≥ 1 − 1/z, and thus,
The mixed state ρ is furthermore rewritten as
and the reduced state ρ 3−i = tr i (ρ) (i = 1, 2) on H 3−i (obtained by tracing out on H i ) is
As tr 1 (|ψ S j ψ S j |) = tr 2 (|ψ S j ψ S j |) from the definition of the symmetric state, tr 1 (ρ) − tr 2 (ρ) = j p j α j β * j [tr 1 (ρ sa j ) − tr 2 (ρ sa j )] + α * j β j [tr 1 (ρ as j ) − tr 2 (ρ as j )] + |β j | 2 [tr 1 (ρ a j ) − tr 2 (ρ a j )] ,
where ρ sa j = |ψ S j ψ A j |, ρ as j = |ψ A j ψ S j |, and ρ a j = |ψ A j ψ A j |. By the positive scalability and the triangle inequality of the trace norm, tr 1 (ρ) − tr 2 (ρ) tr is at most j p j |α j ||β j | tr 1 (ρ sa j ) − tr 2 (ρ sa j ) tr + |α j ||β j | tr 1 (ρ as j ) − tr 2 (ρ as j ) tr +|β j | 2 tr 1 (ρ a j ) − tr 2 (ρ a j ) tr .
As ρ a j is a quantum state (with trace norm 1), we have tr 1 (ρ a j ) − tr 2 (ρ a j ) tr ≤ tr 1 (ρ a j ) tr + tr 2 (ρ a j ) tr = 1 + 1 ≤ 2.
On the contrary, we notice that ρ sa j (or ρ as j ) is not a quantum state. However, by Lemma 12 and the fact that the fidelity between two quantum states is at most 1, where the last inequality comes from the assumption. Thus, the case n holds, and the induction is completed. The second item is proved by Pr[A 1 ∨ · · · ∨ A n ] = 1 − Pr[A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A n ]
where the inequality comes from the first item. ◭
G Parallel Repetition of Protocol P π in the Proof of Theorem 1
The description of the parallel repetition protocol P π [k] considered in Section 4.3 is as follows.
Protocol P π [k]: Soundness amplification of Protocol P π 1. If f (x, y) = 1 then the prover sends the k quantum registers R j,i (i = 1, . . . , k), each of which has a state |h x as certificate, to each of the intermediate nodes v j , j ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}. 2. The left-end node v 0 prepares the k quantum registers R 0,i , each of which has |h x . 3. For every j = 0, . . . , r − 1, the node v j chooses a k-bit string b j,1 · · · b j,k uniformly at random, and sends R j,i , together with the index i, to its right neighbor v j+1 whenever b j,i = 0. 4. For every j = 1, . . . , r − 1 and for every i = 1, . . . , k, if the node v j receives an index i, and if b j,i = 1, then v j performs the SWAP test on (R j−1,i , R j,i ). Node v j rejects whenever at least one of the performed SWAP tests rejects, and it accepts otherwise. 5. If the right-end node v r receives an index i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then it performs the POVM measurement {M y,1 , M y,0 } corresponding to π applied to the state in R r−1,i . Node v r rejects if at least one of the performed POVM measurements rejects, and it accepts otherwise.
